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1. Introduction
Although debates continue on what makes good man-
agement, there is little doubt that management, just
as other production inputs, matters to firm perfor-
mance. Yet the observed effects of management on
performance are in part shaped by corporate gover-
nance practices aimed at dealing with, among other
issues, lack or misallocation of resources within the
firm and agency concerns stemming from the divi-
sion of ownership and control. This study combines
the perspectives on management as an input into pro-
duction function and as an outcome of corporate gov-
ernance in an attempt to produce a fuller picture of
its effect on performance.
Taking the management input perspective, we esti-
mate the effect of middle management skills on the
economic performance of the establishments of a
single firm. Our unique, uniformly collected data
from more than 200 retail stores of a UK clothing
specialist offer an opportunity to study the impor-
tant, but elusive, middle management input (Kanter
2004) in isolation from the confounding influences
of most firm-specific factors. Controlling for a num-
ber of other inputs, observed and unobserved, we
obtain plausible estimates of the differences in sales
per worker between stores due to differences in their
managers’ skill grades, with the highest-grade man-
agers achieving up to 13.9% higher sales per worker
than those with the lowest grade.
We next turn to the corporate governance per-
spective, looking at the particular firmwide practices
shaping the overall contribution of middle manage-
ment to sales: manager allocation among stores and
incentivization. We find that, because it is hard to
dismiss underperforming managers or easily improve
their allocation among stores, the company operates
a type of incentive pay scheme in pay contracts
reviewed every year. Under this scheme, store man-
agers bear a definite share (approximately 20%) in
deviations of actual store sales from expected, giv-
ing them an incentive to perform to the best of their
ability, high or low as the case may be. At the same
time, we find that store managers’ skill grades are not
reflected in their pay. Consistent with the resource-
based view of the firm, these skills therefore exem-
plify highly specific human capital, valuable to the
firm and yet not valued outside, and thus a source of
competitive advantage for the firm that we study.
The rest of the article is organized as follows.
Section 2 offers a review of the literature on the per-
formance effects of middle management and how
these managers are themselves managed. Section 3
introduces the data and estimation techniques used
in the regression analysis that underlies the results
presented in §§4 and 5. In §6 we use our regression
results to assess the economic importance of manage-
ment skills and corporate governance practices and
relate our findings to the earlier studies. Section 7
concludes.
2. Prior Literature and Our Study
“Executives matter” argue Hambrick and Mason
(1984, p. 194), but this proposition is surprisingly
difficult to prove empirically. Further questions as
to how much they matter, and how best to man-
age them, arise. Moreover, these questions radiate
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beyond the top executive to the top management
team (Finkelstein et al. 2009, Chap. 5) and further to
the ranks of middle managers below. The basic diffi-
culty, of course, is that the management input is pecu-
liarly difficult to measure.
Several methods are available. Historically, estimat-
ing the effect of management on performance began
by capturing it through manager (or CEO) fixed
effects. In other words, a panel of firms and CEOs
was followed over time, allowing variation in per-
formance to be apportioned into year, industry, com-
pany, and CEO effects. Studies within this approach
started with Mundlak (1961) (see also Lieberson and
O’Connor 1972, Lieberman et al. 1990, Bertrand and
Shoar 2003, and Crossland and Hambrick 2007). Typi-
cally manager fixed effects are found to be statistically
significant, though to many, starting with Lieberson
and O’Connor (1972), they seem surprisingly small.
There is also the question of what an “average” man-
ager effect can mean, given that industries naturally
vary in the extent to which “managerial discretion”
(Finkelstein et al. 2009, pp. 26–36) can be exercised.
A further problem is that the fixed effects are tracked
via the CEO and offer little insight into Kanter’s
(2004) “innovative” middle management tier.
Another approach to capturing the management
input is to analyze share price movements associated
with CEO turnover, hypothetical or actually observed.
Terviö (2008), using CEO pay as a proxy for their abil-
ity, calculates that, if we were to replace the CEOs of
the 1,000 largest U.S. businesses with the lowest paid
and presumably least able, their total capital value
would fall by 0.13%–0.16% in 2004, or by 4.3%–5.3%
in the long run, applying a 3% future discount rate
(approximately the average of the Federal Reserve
System’s discount rate for 2004). Hayes and Schaefer
(1999) find that share prices fall by 3%–5% when a
(presumably more able) CEO quits for a better job, an
effect of similar magnitude to Terviö’s (2008). How-
ever, the applicability of the approach using share
price movements is limited to large publicly quoted
firms.
A more universal approach is to measure manager
skills directly, which is what we do in this study. Well
known examples of this approach, though initially
confined to skills in the human resource management
(HRM) area, are the Huselid (1995) and Ichniowski
et al. (1997) management practice surveys. Other
studies consider several HRM practices together, as
separate inputs into production process (Capelli and
Neumark 2001) or as “bundles” (Macduffie 1995,
Ichniowski et al. 1997, Black and Lynch 2004). There
are two general conclusions emerging from this lit-
erature: (i) HRM practices matter individually, and
(ii) the effect is greater when they are bundled,
making a coherent work system connected with other
parts of the organizational capital of the firm.
More recently, the surveys have expanded to cover
a wide range of management practices. Bloom and
Van Reenen’s’s (2007) study scores eighteen indi-
vidual practices from 732 firms in four countries
(the United Kingdom, the United States, France, and
Germany) to produce an average management score
for each company. This score, reflecting the overall
ability of the top management team, is found to be
positively associated with a range of firm economic
performance measures. Griffiths et al. (2006) use the
“balanced scorecard” approach of Kaplan and Norton
(1992) to calculate manager scores on financial, cus-
tomer satisfaction, innovation, and internal controls
criteria in stores of a UK building materials whole-
saler, again finding a strong association with firm per-
formance. Their study is more like ours in that it looks
at the middle manager level, with the company’s top
management policies given.
The contribution of managers to firm perfor-
mance is affected by what is known as the “agency
problem”—a misalignment of the manager’s and
the owner’s incentives (Bebchuk and Fried 2003,
Carpenter and Wade 2002). This problem is partic-
ularly important for large and geographically dis-
persed firms such as our study company—hence the
importance of managing the managers in our study.
Specifically, we consider two practices of managing
the managers applied within our study company:
incentivizing store managers to perform and allocat-
ing managers suitably across stores within the firm.
There are two main theoretical models of incen-
tive pay: Holmström’s’s (1979) pay-for-performance
model, which predicts that conditioning pay on out-
put is essential for inducing worker effort, and Lazear
and Rosen’s (1981) tournament-based model, which
predicts that effort is induced by workers’ compet-
ing for higher positions in an organizational hierarchy
offering progressively higher pay. Substantial empir-
ical evidence exists on both models (see Prendergast
1999 for a survey). Specifically for the middle man-
agement level, Lambert et al. (1993) find that the
earnings gap between the plant manager and the cor-
porate CEO can be explained through a mix of pay for
performance and tournaments-based elements. Roth
and O’Donnell’s (1996) study of manager pay in over-
seas subsidiaries finds that the weight given to pay
for performance increases with “cultural distance”
of a subsidiary manager from central headquarters,
which is plausible because cultural distance increases
information asymmetry and hence the extent of the
agency problem. As a contribution to the pay-for-
performance literature, we show how our study com-
pany has developed a manager pay review system
based on expected annual store sales to make the
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most of its available store manager pool. Building
on this system, we develop a measure of expected
sales and find that positive (negative) deviations are
rewarded (punished), as expected.
As for manager allocation, Lucas’s (1978) model
predicts that abler managers will end up in con-
trol of larger establishments, because of the “scale of
operations” effect (that is, the contribution of good
managers to overall profit is magnified by their estab-
lishment’s size). We find the scale of operations effect
is indeed manifested among the company’s stores, but
it seems weaker than in the larger economy (as in
Terviö 2008). Store managers appear difficult to re-
allocate perhaps because their skills are highly spe-
cific (such skills being difficult to imitate and hence a
source of competitive advantage—see Holcomb et al.
2009). In other words, middle managers’ skills in our
company exemplify skills specifically tied (Bailey and
Helfat 2003) to knowledge of their particular store
and its personnel, customers, and internal strengths
and weaknesses. The high proportion of top man-
agers (nearly 90% in Bailey and Helfat’s 2003 study)
recruited internally already suggests skill specificity
at the top level. We now find such specificity farther
down the hierarchy as well.
3. Data and Method
3.1. The Study Company
Our study company is a large UK-based clothing
retailer with more than 600 stores in the United King-
dom and many more internationally, though we con-
fine ourselves to the UK operations. At the top of
the organizational hierarchy is central headquarters
(HQ), where companywide financial, marketing, and
operational decisions are made. Thus, HQ decides on
the goods to be sold and managers to be employed
at each store, as well as their remuneration. Sales
assistants’ pay rates and store wage budgets are also
set by HQ in the beginning of each accounting year
(February), taking into account changes in operat-
ing environment and newly acquired information.
Wage budgets, in particular, are set according to a
“wage budget rule,” allowing wages to be no more
than a certain fraction (approximately 10%) of the
previous year’s sales. This rule of course sets an
important constraint on how many worker-hours a
manager can hire over the year because wage rates
are given. A network of twenty regional managers
coordinates store managers and, importantly, negoti-
ates the implementation of the wage budget rule and
helps assess store manager performance.
Even though store managers’ activities are closely
directed by HQ, which sets both product prices and
wage budgets, they have considerable autonomy in
the day-to-day running of their stores, and their
assessments reveal considerable variation in their
skill levels (see §3.3). Generally speaking, they must
maintain an attractive store appearance and provide
adequate customer service within the store’s wage
budget. An important part of this task is ensuring
there are enough sales assistants at all times, which
is generally achieved through maintaining a pool of
part-time workers employed at peak times and laid
off when business is quiet. Store managers are also
responsible for sales assistants’ selection, training, and
promotion; in fact, nearly two-thirds of store man-
agers are recruited from sales assistants.
Our analysis runs through the data collected for the
trading year February 2005 to February 2006. The rea-
son for taking only one year’s worth of observations
is to ensure that the same manager was in charge of a
given store for the entire study period. All managers
who participated in the assessment must have been
running their stores for at least a year as of February
2006. There are 245 such stores.
3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 1 offers an illustration of the workings of our
study company and its environment. The average
store is, in UK terms, comparable to a small enter-
prise, producing approximately £60 worth of sales
per worker-hour, employing 314.5 worker-hours of
labor per week (8.4 full-time-equivalent (FTE) work-
ers, 1 week = 375 hours), and occupying approxi-
mately 150 square meters of space (store space being
our measure of capital input). Even though all our
stores belong to the same company, selling the main
brand of medium-priced casual clothing and gen-
erally located in large shopping centers, they vary
considerably in sales per worker-hour (our measure
of labor productivity), giving a standard deviation
of £15.07. We aim to explain this high variation in
productivity.
The company needs to accommodate large fluctu-
ations in business by day of the week and season,
which requires a flexible workforce. Indeed, most of
the sales assistants work less than 15 hours per week.
There is also considerable employee turnover (the
FTE separation rate is 15% annually, approximately
30% in headcount terms), characteristic of the retail
sector. Such fluid conditions present a challenge to the
store manager, who must match labor input to fluc-
tuating demand while keeping labor turnover under
control. Competitive pressures, averaging 36.45 stores
in the catchment area, pose another challenge for store
managers.
We see that an average store manager is in her
late 30s and has been with the company for a con-
siderable part of her working life. Most of the man-
agers are women, but the share of men (0.27) is twice
as high as for sales assistants. Their average pay rate
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Table 1 Descriptive Statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. dev.
Store characteristics
Sales per hour worked 12671 5993 1507
Total hours worked per week 12671 31448 21176
Capital control: Store space in
square meters
245 14898 8247
Store belongs to:
Main brand 245 093 026
Other brands 245 007 026
Store location:
Stand-alone, city center 245 013 034
Stand-alone, local area 245 01 03
Subregional shopping center 245 044 05
Regional shopping center 245 016 037
Other 245 017 036
Share of children’s products in
total sales
245 029 011
Sales assistants characteristics
Average sales assistant’s age,
years, adjusted for full-time
equivalence (FTE)
245 3471 661
Average sales assistant’s tenure,
years, FTE
245 726 371
Share of male sales assistants,
FTE
245 013 014
Share of sales assistants working:
0–4 hours per week 245 033 019
5–14 hours per week 245 025 017
15–30 hours per week 245 022 016
30+ hours per week 245 02 01
Sales assistant’s average hourly
pay
245 502 023
Area average hourly pay for a
similar joba
21 749 087
Number of sales assistants
working on an average week
12656 1532 1106
Number of sales assistants ever
worked during the year
245 2247 1704
Separations rate, FTE 245 015 011
Area characteristics
Area average pay 21 1105 154
Area unemployment rate 21 005 001
Number of competitors in a
store’s catchment areac
245 3645 2589
Store manager characteristics
Manager age (years) 236 3806 1009
Manager experience (years) 236 1071 638
Store manager is male 236 027 044
Manager hourly pay (based on
1,900 hours worked per year),
data for 2006
236 1124 259
Area average hourly pay for a
similar jobb, data for
January–September 2006
21 1106 145
aIntermediate, routine, and semiroutine sales and services (categories 7.2,
12.1, 12.2, and 13.1 of the Labour Force Survey occupation classifier).
bLower managerial (category 5.0) and lower and higher supervisory occu-
pations (categories 6.0 and 10.0).
cInformation on competitors in each store’s catchment area is derived
from a company survey.
(£11.24 per hour) exceeds that for similar occupations
in the area (£11.06 per hour)—unlike that of sales
assistants. Note that the manager pay data are for
2006, one year after the sales data, as our incentive
pay model (§5.1) requires.
3.3. Key Behavioral Indicators
The basis for our study is the company’s unique sur-
vey of six management practice areas, or key behav-
ioral indicators (KBIs): “sales focus,” “commercial
awareness,” “developing people,” “drive and personal
development,” “leadership,” and “planning and orga-
nizing.” Each participating store manager received
one of the three grades for each KBI—“development
need” (signifying inadequate performance), “capable”
(minimum appropriate performance), and “strength”
(exceptional performance)—matching the grade
descriptions in Table 2. In addition to the individual
KBI grades, the managers’ overall performance was
also graded, ranging from E (lowest) to A (highest),
based on the sum of scores on individual KBIs. All
managers who had worked in their stores for at least
one year as of early 2006 took part. This minimum
tenure restriction ensures that every store manager
had enough evidence for his or her skills to be ade-
quately assessed. It took a dedicated HR team, store,
and area managers five months to collect, verify, and
summarize these data.
The objectivity of the KBI grades is important
because we wish to use them to help explain store
performance (as, indeed, does the company). Let us
first consider the KBI measurement method. Each
store manager had initially to self-assess by filling in
the survey questionnaire. Those self-assessments were
later discussed with the area managers, and then,
based on the evidence supporting the self-assessment
results, agreed assessments were produced.
As we show, it is the area manager who gives the
KBI measures objectivity. The question is whether the
area manager is influenced by store sales themselves
in assessing the store manager skills, which we now
consider. Given the lack of repeated KBI observations
by store, we cannot test for a possible reverse causal-
ity between sales and KBI grades, which remains a
caveat to our analysis. However, we believe that sales
affecting KBI grades is unlikely, because there is no
mention of sales in the KBI grade descriptions. Sales
together with other “hard” performance outcomes,
such as employee turnover and the wage budget tar-
get, were monitored in a separate Key Performance
Indicators survey administered by another depart-
ment within the company. The KBI survey, on the
other hand, is an expensive effort aimed at identify-
ing managers’ strengths and weaknesses and testing
the company’s beliefs about which managerial skills
are good for performance (in fact, our results do not
support some of these beliefs).
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Table 2 Key Behavioral Indicators
KBI and components Grade capable Grade strength
I. Sales focus
1. Maintains high operational and visual
standards
Delivers the company operational and visual
standards to drive sales performance
Generates a passion for high operational and visual
standards in everyone; store consistently delivers
high standards
2. Uses company initiatives to increase sales Makes sure all training and selling initiatives are
delivered
Gains commitment from all team members so that
training and selling initiatives become properly
embedded
3. Exhibits and develops selling skills within
the team
Displays thorough product knowledge and effective
selling skills; flexes selling conversations
according to consumer types
Can model excellent selling skills; observes
performance on sales floor and gives feedback
and recommendations for improvement
4. Uses reports and information to improve
sales performance
Reviews and analyzes reports and sales information
to improve performance
Uses information to identify additional selling
opportunities
5. Uses knowledge of fashion trends to
enhance sales performance
Keeps up to date with fashion trends, can relate them
to products, and uses this knowledge in selling
Develops in others a knowledge of fashion trends
and an ability to incorporate this when selling
II. Commercial awareness
1. Aligns own plans to business priorities Makes plans for peak trading periods to ensure
effective use of resources
Knows the trading period strategy and uses it to
identify priorities and determine plans that will
provide the best financial results
2. Uses knowledge of products to maximize
business performance
Knows the performance of all departments and key
products within each of these
Makes the best use of space on the sales floor given
the store’s product mix
3. Delivers controllable costs Can manage payroll and makes plans to deliver wage
control
Is flexible and can adjust manpower to deliver a
great experience for customers while achieving
the wage control targets
4. Observes own and monitors competitors’
activity
Constantly reviews the store through the eyes of a
customer and makes adjustments to improve the
shopping experience
Monitors local competitors and considers shopping
experiences in other retailers to make
improvements in own store
III. Leadership
1. Is a positive role model Behavior and work of a high professional standard.
Respected by colleagues
Is a highly credible role model, an inspiration for
others
2. Is an effective communicator Sets clear expectations of performance standards
Communicates information clearly and concisely
Listens and responds well. Encourages sharing of
ideas; adapts the style of communication to build
rapport
3. Builds winning teams Encourages a sense of friendly competition and
cooperation; praises and recognizes good
performance
Generates a positive “buzz”; coaches and motivates
the team to succeed while maintaining good
working relationships
4. Makes sound decisions Can be relied on to make decisions right for the store
and the business
Makes excellent decisions and considers their
immediate and long-term impact; puts plans in
place to overcome potential barriers
5. Manages poor performance Takes appropriate and timely action to address poor
performance
Differentiates between conduct and capability,
identifies the root cause of poor performance and
manages it accordingly
6. Deals with and resolves problems Can deal with problems and seeks advice when
needed to resolve them
Tackles problems in their early stages and can make
sound decisions to resolve them objectively
7. Manages change Reacts to change positively and sells the benefits to
the team
Puts plans in place to implement change
successfully; deals with resistance in a positive
way
IV. Developing people
1. Uses company recruitment and induction
practices
Follows company procedures in recruitment;
provides induction training to new hires
Has a good working knowledge of recruitment
practices; follows up all induction sessions to
ensure their effectiveness
2. Uses training to continuously improve
performance
Ensures everyone complete standard training
requirements; keeps training records up to date
Identifies training need and uses available materials
to deliver effective training
3. Uses feedback to improve performance Gives genuine praise and constructive criticism to
improve performance
Consistently uses feedback to enhance performance
4. Completes performance development
reviews
Ensures all employees attend one review meeting
each year to agree on business goals and identify
development opportunities
Follows up the formal performance review with
informal reviews of the agreed goals and
development activities
5. Develops people for the future Identifies and develops individuals who demonstrate
potential and a desire to progress
Has a succession plan in place and develops talent
so that positions can be filled internally
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Table 2 (Continued)
KBI and components Grade capable Grade strength
V. Drive and personal development
1. Is committed to company standards Shows commitment to achieve agreed performance
standards
Strives to exceed performance standards
2. Is motivated to succeed Demonstrates passion and enthusiasm, is motivated
to succeed
Is a self-starter, is consistently passionate, and
shows dedication to the task
3. Responds to challenges positively Maintains a positive outlook and responds to
challenges well
Demonstrates a “can do” attitude. Is resilient under
challenging circumstances
4. Takes responsibility for own development Maintains a personal development plan; can
demonstrate improvements in skills, knowledge,
and behavior over time
Looks for opportunities to enhance skills and
knowledge; shows initiative to improve self
VI. Planning and organizing
1. Plans in advance Uses company materials to plan in advance Plans ahead on a daily and weekly basis and
carefully considers forthcoming trading periods
2. Prioritizes tasks Considers tasks according to importance and
urgency; understands the difference among
“must do,” “should do,” and “nice to do”
Prioritizes logically and according to maximum
business benefit
3. Delegates effectively and meets deadlines Delegates tasks and follows them up to ensure that
deadlines are met
Delegates appropriately and takes time to put tasks
into context; monitors progress so that deadlines
are met
Note. Grade “development need” was given for substandard performance.
Source. Survey documentation, minimal editing applied.
Looking at the KBI grade descriptions in Table 2,
we see an extensive range of practices, from the
more administrative (such as planning and organiz-
ing) to the more entrepreneurial (such as commercial
awareness). Attention is paid to HRM practices, too,
with the KBI developing people related to some of
the “high-performance” work practices described in
Pfeffer (1998), such as training and communication
with employees. Admittedly, there are overlaps; for
example, both sales focus and leadership reward team
building. At the same time, the important commercial
awareness KBI appears to be unique. It emphasizes
four skills: Knowing the trading period strategy, mon-
itoring local competition, adjusting manpower subject
to wage control, and making best use of space—none
of which are touched on by the other KBIs. As we
show below, by comparing the estimates for the KBIs
entered separately and jointly into the sales equation,
the characteristics of commercial awareness matter for
sales the most. To repeat, none of the four skills mea-
sured under this KBI mentions store sales.
Table 3 shows that the performance of store man-
agers with respect to the KBIs varies considerably.
Approximately 20% were rated as development need
for sales focus, commercial awareness, leadership,
and drive and personal development, and approxi-
mately one-quarter were rated at the highest grade.
The best-performing KBI is planning and organizing,
in which 95% of the store managers achieve satisfac-
tory performance. The weakest results are for devel-
oping people, with 40% of store managers rated as
underperforming.
We would expect the KBI grades to be linked to
store labor productivity. Indeed, as Table 3 demon-
strates, managers with higher KBI grades are found
in more productive stores. This early indication of
the link between manager skills and performance
is encouraging but needs to be tested controlling
for other factors, especially the fact that stores with
higher-graded managers are also larger and located in
more competitive areas, each of these factors affecting
productivity on its own. In the sections to follow, we
apply multivariate regression analysis to test whether
the KBIs really translate into sales performance.
3.4. Estimation Issues
We begin our regression analysis by estimating the
contribution of manager skills to sales, controlling
for labor and store space, as well as store, area, and
workforce characteristics. We do not have data on the
cost of sales, which is an obvious input in the sales
function, but, plausibly assuming that it is a constant
fraction of the total sales, we can abstract from it.
We assume that the sales function is Cobb-Douglas.
Our robustness checks (skipped here but available on
request) show that this simple functional form is ade-
quate for our data.
Because management input is fixed for the whole
year, we could in principle aggregate our weekly sales
and labor input data and estimate the sales func-
tion on the year totals. The problem with this simple
approach, however, is that it may bias the estimate
for the elasticity of sales with respect to the labor
input, leading to biased estimates for manager skills
because labor and management inputs are correlated.
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Table 3 Averages of Key Variables by KBI Grade
FTE Store Manager Competition, Sales per
KBI Grade % personnel space, sq. m pay, £/hour 1 to 4a hour worked, £
Sales focus Development need 1714 649 11957 1048 224 5545
Capable 5918 797 14293 1095 241 5947
Strength 2368 1161 18537 1255 282 6160
Commercial awareness Development need 1755 656 12573 1029 219 5559
Capable 5633 775 13941 1096 231 5849
Strength 2612 1172 18524 1254 307 6280
Leadership Development need 1755 730 13625 1055 240 5734
Capable 5429 749 13271 1083 227 5924
Strength 2816 1148 18828 1253 286 6101
Developing people Development need 3959 733 13450 1065 231 5832
Capable 4490 824 14066 1108 239 5936
Strength 1551 1274 21002 1324 309 6220
Drive and personal Development need 2122 687 12504 1061 229 5720
development Capable 4980 800 14058 1110 235 5943
Strength 2898 1083 18095 1195 280 6104
Planning and organizing Development need 449 713 13522 1102 236 6056
Capable 4204 697 12462 1054 218 5753
Strength 5347 997 16929 1180 271 6086
a1= number of competitors 1–17 (bottom 25%), 2= 18–30, 3= 31–51, and 4= 52+ (top 25%).
The current year’s labor input is correlated with the
last year’s shock to sales through the wage budget
rule. If the last year’s shock to sales continues to
affect the current year’s sales then sales and labor
input will be simultaneously determined, causing an
upward bias to labor input’s estimate. Indeed, run-
ning a simple regression with year totals (not shown)
gives an improbably large labor input elasticity
estimate: 1.02.
An alternative approach, also implemented in pre-
vious studies of the management input (e.g., Black
and Lynch 2004, Bloom and Van Reenen’s 2007), is
to include store fixed effects in the production func-
tion to control for the possible correlation between
labor input, which varies by week, and store-specific
unobservables (such as last year’s sales shock), which
are fixed for at least one year. Having weekly data
on sales and employment, we also allow for dynam-
ics in the response of sales to changes in labor input.
For instance, hours spent on shelving in one week
may increase sales in the following weeks. Our inclu-
sion of lags will improve the quality of the estimates
for labor input by allowing for differences between
short- and long-run labor input elasticities. However,
the lags do not change the regression estimates for the
KBIs materially.
Because, like unobservables, management, store
space, and other controls are also fixed throughout
the year, introducing store fixed effects necessitates a
two-stage estimation procedure as follows. At the first
stage we obtain the estimates for the short- and long-
run labor input elasticities, 1 and  1+ 2/1− ˆ,
by running the sales equation with store fixed effects:
lnsalesit =  lnsalesit−1+1 lnlaborit
+2 lnlaborit−1+week dummyt
+ fixed effecti + error1st stageit 	 (1)
where i = 1   245 and t = 1   52 are the store and
week counters. The elasticities’ standard errors are
calculated by using the delta method.1 We then pro-
ceed to the second stage, where we use the estimated
fixed effects as the dependent variable, as follows:
̂fixed effecti = 
1 lnspacei +
2KBIi +
3other controlsi
+ error2nd stagei  (2)
It is at this stage that we obtain the estimates (
2) for
the KBI grades.
The literature identifies three other estimation
issues. First, the labor input elasticity may be overes-
timated since sales and labor input may be simultane-
ously determined by an unobserved process (Blundell
1 To see that 1 and  1 + 2/1− ˆ represent the short- and long-
run labor input elasticities, it is enough to rewrite Equation (1) in
the error-correction form,
 lnsalesit = 1 lnlaborit + error1st stageit
−1−


lnsalesit−1−
1+2
1− lnlaborit−1
− 1
1−week dummyt−
1
1− fixed effecti


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et al. 2000), for instance, change in consumer tastes.
To correct for the upward bias, following Bloom and
Van Reenen’s (2007), we instrument labor input with
its lags from 2 to 5. We find, however, that instru-
mentation makes little difference to the estimates, pre-
sumably because using data from a single company
helps ensure that time-varying unobservables are the
same for all stores and thus can be captured by the
week dummies. Second, estimating a dynamic equa-
tion such as (1) on panel data produces a bias to some
of the estimates, mainly  (Nickell 1981), which can
be corrected by instrumenting the lagged dependent
variable with its earlier lags. We choose, however,
not to instrument it because of the loss of efficiency
that the instrumenting would entail, while the bias in
question is negligible in long (52 weeks) panels such
as ours (see Judson and Owen 1999 for Monte-Carlo
simulations of the bias). Finally, we test for autocor-
relation in the first-stage regression residual, finding
which would imply an incorrectly specified model
because in that case the error term would be corre-
lated with one of the regression variables, lnsalesit−1.
Our first-stage regression passes this test.
3.5. Causality or Association?
As noted earlier (Lucas 1978), it is profit-maximizing
for the company to allocate store managers with
better skills to bigger and better-performing stores
because store size and efficiency magnify the contri-
bution of more skilled managers to the total profit.
The consequence of such nonrandom allocation will
be an overestimate of the causal effect of manager
skills on sales unless we can control for all of the rele-
vant factors or use suitable instruments to recover the
causal effect. Still, in the absence of such instruments
and controls, we can reduce this bias by introducing
a proxy for the unobservables as we now explain.
Suppose that, holding all else constant, log sales
depend on log management input (x), an unobserved
store characteristic (z), and random noise () that is
uncorrelated with both x and z,
lnsales=  · x+ z+ 
Because z is not observed, we estimate
lnsales= ˜ · x+ e	
where e = z+ . Applying the omitted variable bias
formula, the expected value of the effect of manage-
ment on sales is
˜= + covx	 z
varx
	
which is biased upward by covx	 z/varx to the
extent that better managers (higher x) are allocated to
intrinsically more-productive stores (higher z).
To illustrate this bias on our data, we run par-
tial correlations between the commercial awareness
score (0 = “development need,” 1 = “capable,” 2 =
“strength”) as the measure of management input (x)
and the store’s annual labor input (denoted z∗). The
store’s annual labor input is used here because it is
closely correlated with the unobserved z, holding all
other inputs in the sales function fixed.2 The estimate
for the bias, covx	 z∗/varx, is 0.062. This estimate
tells us that, if not corrected for the bias, the effect of
management on sales will be overestimated, but it is
not informative enough about the magnitude of the
bias because we do not observe the distribution of the
true z.
Adding store-specific fixed effects, as is done in
Capelli and Neumark (2001) and Ichniowski et al.
(1997), would eliminate this bias, but then the effect
of management would not be separately identified
because management input does not vary within
store. We can, however, reduce the bias and allow
for some independent variation in management input
by grouping stores likely to have similar unobserv-
ables. Store size measured as annual labor input is
an appropriate criterion for grouping because, as we
showed above, it is correlated with the unobserv-
ables that we aim to capture. In fact, grouping stores
into four size quartiles and adding a fixed effect for
each quartile reduces the estimated bias by 75%, from
0.062 to 0.016, implying that stores within the same
size quartile are quite similar in terms of the unob-
servables. Our procedure thus corrects for a large part
of the nonrandom manager selection bias, bringing
the estimates for manager skills closer to their true
causal effect.
4. Regression Results for Store Sales
Table 4 presents the regression results from both
stages of the estimation procedure together. The
first-stage results are the same for all specifica-
tions reported in this table. The short- and long-
run labor input elasticities (0.279 and 0.516, respec-
tively) differ in a predictable direction, implying that
2 Consider a Cobb-Douglas sales function with three inputs,
labor (L), capital (K), and management (X), and a total factor pro-
ductivity component (A) summarising all other influences on out-
put. Maximising expected sales across the stores,
∑N
i=1Ai · Li ·K
i ·
Xi · ezi , subject to the budget constraint,
∑N
i=1w1i ·Li +w2i ·Xi= B,
with wages (w1i	w2i) given and K fixed, a typical first-order condi-
tion for labor is
lnLi = −
1
1−−  ·
(
ln+ 1−  ln w1i

+  ln w2i

)
+ 1
1−−  lnAi +


1−−  lnKi +
1
1−−  · zi	
where  is the Lagrange multiplier. So, controlling for capital input,
wages and A, the store’s annual labor input is simply linked to the
unobserved store characteristic z.
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Table 4 Regression Results for Sales
Dependent variable: Log sales (1)a (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
First-stage equation (1)b
Labor, short-run 0279∗∗∗
Labor, long-run 0516∗∗∗
Adjusted R2 0.678
Number of observations 12,671
Second-stage equation (2)
Management gradesc
Sales focus
“Capable” 0056∗∗ −0002 0004 0011 0011 0004 0004
“Strength” 0114∗∗∗ 0029 0029 0029 0030 0030 0016
Commercial awareness
“Capable” 0099∗∗∗ 0100∗∗∗ 0092∗∗∗ 0074∗∗
“Strength” 0176∗∗∗ 0165∗∗∗ 0139∗∗∗ 0120∗∗∗
Commercial awareness score (0= “development need,” 0078∗∗∗ 0058∗ 0067∗∗∗
1= “capable,” 2= “strength”)
Leadership
“Capable” 0078∗∗∗ 0056∗∗ 0053 0026 0027 0028 0001
“Strength” 0092∗∗∗ 0022 0016 −0015 −0015 −0012 −0026
Developing people
“Capable” 0014 −0023 −0019 −0028 −0030 −0035 −0046
“Strength” 0074∗∗∗ 0002 −0003 −0022 −0024 −0024 −0026
Drive and pers. development
“Capable” 0032 0008 0010 −0014 −0014 −0017 −0020
“Strength” 0079∗∗∗ 0024 0034 −0010 −0006 −0011 −0018
Planning and organizing
“Capable” −0015 −0056 −0051 −0042 −0038 −0043 −0029
“Strength” 0032 −0064 −0062 −0039 −0040 −0044 −0034
Overall grade (relative to C)
A or B (15.1% of sample) 0013
D or E (19.6%) −0083∗∗∗
Other controls
Store space 0284∗∗∗ 0282∗∗∗ 0113∗ 0115∗∗ 0116∗∗ 0109
Weekly contract hoursd
0–4 0251∗∗∗ 0280∗ 0209∗ 0213∗ 0195 0216∗
5–14 0147 0163 0180 0182 0176 0188
15–29 0168∗ 0198 0151 0161 0147 0166
ln(area average pay) 0770∗∗∗ 0737∗ 0543∗ 0517 0526 0427
Area unemployment rate −2449∗ −2268 −1591 −1455 −1464 −1183
ln(store assistant relative pay) 0703∗∗∗ 0724∗∗ 0645∗∗ 0617∗∗ 0623∗∗ 0500∗
Competitors in catchment areae
18–30 0012 0015 −0021 −0023 −0025 0005
31–51 0143∗∗∗ 0141∗∗∗ 0010 0008 0011 0037
52+ 0248∗∗∗ 0237∗∗∗ 0073 0072 0081 0094∗
Store size quartile fixed effectsf No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Quartile effects× comm. awareness score No No No Yes No No No
Adjusted R2 0785 0785 0872 0873 0873 0877
Number of observations 245
Note. Other controls in each specification include week dummies, area manager dummies (20), location, brand, average employee age, tenure, turnover, share
of male employees, share of children’s products in total.
aThe estimates for other controls in column (1) are skipped because column (1) summarizes results from six separate regressions, one for each KBI. These
are available on request.
bObservations for the first stage are store weeks; labor input is instrumented with its lags from 2 to 5.
c“Development need” is the base category.
dShare of employees working 30+ hours per week is the base category.
eThe number of competitors fewer than 17 (first quartile of distribution) is the base category.
fThe store quartile fixed effects are four dummies picking up the annual labor input size quartile in which each store falls.
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote estimates significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.
it takes longer than one week for sales to react to
an extra hour worked. The reduction in the magni-
tude of the long-run labor input elasticity to 0.516
from 1.02 estimated earlier is consistent with our
hypothesis that last year’s sales shocks persist. The
sum of the long-run labor elasticity, 0.516, plus the
capital (store space) elasticity of approximately 0.11
in our preferred specification (column (6)) gives a
returns to scale value below unity (as required for
the company’s profit maximization problem to have
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an interior solution). Thus, our two-step procedure,
which uses weekly, within-store variation in labor
input—independent of last year’s sales shocks—is
required to derive reasonable labor input elasticity
and returns to scale parameters.
Turning to the KBI grades, we first enter them into
the sales equation one by one (column (1)) and then
together (columns (2)–(7)) with the aim of detecting
overlaps and finding which one is most important.
Looking at column (1), which contains estimates from
six separate regressions, one for each KBI, most KBIs
are individually significant. Yet whenever all six KBIs
are included together (for instance, in column (2))
only commercial awareness remains significant. The
loss of individual significance of KBI grades indicates
substantial intercorrelations between different KBIs,
probably as a result of overlapping definitions. Yet
evidently it is the special characteristics of commer-
cial awareness that are important for sales because its
coefficients are similar whether entered separately or
jointly. As noted above, these characteristics consist
mainly of entrepreneurial skills, such as monitoring
local competition and efficient use of resources subject
to the wage budget rule. These skills are not assessed
based on sales, so the estimates for commercial aware-
ness are unlikely to be driven by reverse causality.
Our next step is to address the issue of nonrandom
allocation of managers to stores, which, as discussed
in §3.5, results in an upward bias for the KBI esti-
mates. We concentrate on the most important com-
mercial awareness KBI, beginning with column (3),
where, for simplicity, the commercial awareness score
is used instead of grade dummies. Following the pro-
cedure outlined in §3.5, we introduce quartile fixed
effects as partial controls for the unobservables, and
their cross-products with the commercial awareness
score, thus allowing each quartile of store size to have
its own bias to the commercial awareness score esti-
mate (column (4)). We see that, consistent with the
predicted upward bias, the estimate for the commer-
cial awareness score goes down from 0.078 in col-
umn (3) to 0.058 in column (4). The quartile fixed
effects are highly significant, but the cross-products
are not (restrictions test p-value = 070), so we skip
them in columns (5)–(7). Their insignificance implies
that the bias due to nonrandom allocation of man-
agers to stores is approximately the same for big
stores as for small. Comparing the estimates for the
commercial awareness score in the specifications with
the quartile fixed effects (0.067, column (5)) and with-
out (0.078, column (3)) shows that this bias is not
large. Turning to our preferred specification with KBI
grade dummies (column (6)), we see that control-
ling for quartile fixed effects reduces the estimates for
grade capable from 0.100 (column (2)) to 0.092, i.e.,
9.2% higher sales than grade development need, and
for grade strength from 0.165 to 0.139.
In addition to individual KBIs, we introduce dum-
mies for the overall grade (an indicator based on the
sum of KBI scores; see §3.3) to find out whether there
is a joint effect of several KBIs not captured by their
individual estimates. We find (column (7)) that sets of
different competencies matter beyond their individ-
ual components, supporting the management practice
complementarity view (Macduffie 1995, Ichniowski
et al. 1997). Our results imply that failing to develop
some minimal proficiency in all competence areas
(overall grade C) results in 8.3% lower sales. Yet
excelling in overall performance (grade A or B) as
opposed to particular competencies brings little addi-
tional benefit (1.3%, and insignificant). Still, in all
specifications, the commercial awareness KBI retains
its importance.
Turning to the controls, we see that paying
higher wages relative to competitors’ enters posi-
tively, reflecting presumably the better quality of
attracted workers. Sales tend to be higher in wealthier
areas and in areas where there are clusters of com-
petitors. Importantly, many controls lose magnitude
and significance once quartile fixed effects, proxy-
ing for unobservables in our analysis, are introduced.
The case of local competition is instructive. Its loss
of importance suggests that much of its correlation
with sales was due to its correlation with the unob-
servables such as special location, which are now
better controlled. Thus, the implication is that it is
not that high competition results in more sales, but
rather that more competitors are lured to more advan-
tageous locations.3 Picking up location, the quartile
fixed effects also contribute to the control for capital,
whose estimate goes down as we introduce them.
5. Managing the Managers
We have seen that the company has a substan-
tial minority (approximately 18%, Table 3) of under-
performing store managers, i.e., those with grade
development need for commercial awareness, whose
stores generate significantly less sales than com-
parable stores with more capable managers. To
some extent, the wide distribution of manager skill
grades within our company parallels Bloom and Van
Reenen’s (2007) cross-company distribution, which
reveals “huge heterogeneity” (p. 1379) and a long tail
of managers with low skill ratings. However, their
3 It might be thought, alternatively, that the effect of competition
on performance fully manifests itself in better management (as in
Griffiths 2001). However, competition is insignificant in the size
quartile fixed effects specification even when the management KBIs
are excluded.
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Table 5 Determinants of Manager to Store Allocation
Dependent variable:
Commercial awareness score (1) (2) (3) (4)
Log annual labor input 0372∗∗∗ 0303∗∗∗ 0355∗∗∗
Competitors in catchment area
18–30 0063 −0058 −0033
31–51 0111 −0106 −0092
52+ 0510∗∗∗ 0172 0152
ln(area average pay) 0128
Store type and location dummies No No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0093 0079 0104 0101
Number of observations 245
Note. The commercial awareness score takes the value 0 for “development
need,” 1 for “capable,” and 2 for “strength.”
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote estimates significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
finding that poor family-owned company manage-
ment accounts for some of this tail clearly cannot
apply in our case where ownership is held constant.
Their other finding, that more intense competition
leads to weeding out bad managers, seems more
applicable but requires an investigation into the prac-
tices of managing store managers, which is the topic
of the present section.
We consider three broad ways to manage store
managers, first by matching managers to appropri-
ate stores, second by weeding out the poor managers
as they reveal themselves, and finally by provid-
ing incentives to the existing management team.
As regards matching managers to stores, we report in
Table 5 the results of regressing the managers’ com-
mercial awareness score on their store size (measured
as log annual labor input) and area characteristics.
We find, consistent with Lucas’s (1978) theory, that
store size measured in log annual labor input is
the single most important correlate of manager
skill grade in a given store, whether other possi-
ble factors, including local competition, are present
(columns (2)–(4)) or not (column (1)). That said, the
estimated elasticity of commercial awareness score to
store size (0.355) is rather small, implying a mere
0.3 standard deviation increase in the average com-
mercial awareness score with a one standard devia-
tion increase in store size. (Ordered probit and logit
estimators that we have used as alternatives to the
ordinary least squares estimator in Table 5 give simi-
larly low elasticity.) Thus, the allocation of managers
to stores does not look very precise.
Turning to the possibility of weeding out the poor
managers, the distribution of manager skill grades
is hard to improve for several reasons. First, store
managers tend to be attached to their locality, and
with an average salary of £21,000 per year (just under
the national average) attracting new talent is difficult.
Second, as our top management informants explained,
it is expensive in the UK legal context to weed out
the bad managers through dismissal. The option of
demotion is also disruptive. Third, management tal-
ent is difficult to identify, especially as it appears to
be highly company specific (see discussion of the pay
regressions below). Therefore, because the company
is unable to improve the quality of its store manager
pool easily, it is left with the option of incentivizing its
managers to perform to the best of their ability, as we
show next.
5.1. A Model of Incentive Pay
Consider an incentive pay model in the spirit
of Holmström’s (1979) (see also Holmström and
Milgrom 1987), with a risk-neutral company and a
risk-averse manager, but which includes manager
skill. In year t, the manager produces output (y),
which depends on her effort (), observable to her
only, skill level (c), observable to both parties, and the
annual random shock term (), observable to none:4
yt = t if t = 0	
yt = t + c+t if t > 0
The manager expects a wage wt+1 to be paid at the
beginning of the next period, which in part depends
on her past period’s output,
wt+1 = +
t if t = 0	
wt+1 = +
t + c+t if t > 0
She chooses the level of effort,
∗t =



	 (3)
which maximizes her utility function,
Uwt+1	 t= Ewt+1−  ·
2t
2
− ·varwt+1	
where parameters  > 0 and  > 0 represent the cost
of effort and aversion to uncertainty over the realized
value of output.5 She will work only if her utility given
her chosen effort is no less than her utility from work-
ing elsewhere, u¯ht	 c, which we assume to depend
on her skill level c and her outside options (vector ht).
The company maximizes its expected profit defined
as the difference between the output in period t
4 There are, of course, other determinants of output, such as store
size, but, assuming that their contribution to output does not
depend on manager’s effort, their “prices” can be agreed on in
advance rather than determined endogenously within the incentive
pay model. Therefore, we abstract from them for now for the ease
of exposition.
5 Our assumption that the cost of effort,  > 0, is invariant with
respect to manager skill level is admittedly heroic, but we test it
and find it to hold (results are available upon request).
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and the wage to be paid to the manager, having
worked out the manager’s chosen level of effort ∗t
(Equation (3)). The result of a strategic interaction
between the company and the manager is a wage
offer with the following parameters:
∗t = u¯ht	 c−
c
1+ 2 ·vart
− 1− 2 ·vart
21+ 2 ·vart2
	

∗t =
1
1+ 2 ·vart
	
(4)
simplifying to
wt+1 = u¯ht	 c+
1
2
∗t
+
∗t t (5)
For the empirically relevant case of 0< 
∗t < 1, the
model implies that pay is determined by (i) the man-
ager’s outside alternatives (u¯ht	 c) and (ii) meeting
sales expectations set by HQ given the manager’s skill
level and other inputs (t). If these expectations are
not met, the manager takes a proportionate 
∗t cut
in her next year’s pay, and conversely if expectations
are exceeded. The dependence of a manager’s pay
on meeting HQ’s expectations helps ensure that she
applies herself even if close monitoring of her activ-
ities is not possible. We expect 
∗t to be less than
unity because of manager risk aversion ( > 0). The
model thus also implies that managers are “insured”
by bearing only a fraction of the shock.
5.2. Store Manager Pay Regression Specification
We now develop a suitable proxy for t and test the
above model by estimating the manager pay equa-
tion (5). It might be thought that Equation (5) can
be estimated directly by using the available store and
manager data and the estimated second-stage error
term from the sales regression (error2nd stagei ) as a proxy
for the annual random shock term . The problem
with this direct approach is that error2nd stagei contains
components observable to both HQ and store man-
agers (and therefore not part of the unexpected sales)
but not observable to us. Indeed, we show in Table 6
that error2nd stagei is not a significant predictor of pay.
However, adding some intuitive structure to it brings
back its significance.
Assume that the current (2005) year’s error term
from Equation (2) is a function of the last year’s error
term plus our annual random shock term ():
error2nd stagei =$ · error2nd stagei	−1 +i	 (6)
where 0 < $ < 1 is the autoregression parameter.
This assumption is reasonable because many unob-
servables (for instance, location or tastes) can have
Table 6 Regression Results for the Store Manager Pay Equation (5)
Dependent variable: Log 2006 pay (1) (2) (3)
Error term from sales equation 0033
(error 2nd stage)a
Log unexpected sales ()b 0233∗∗∗ 0238∗
Log average pay for similar job 0343∗∗∗ 0354∗∗∗
Log FTE personnel 0281∗∗∗ 0284∗∗∗
Store manager age 0010∗ 0011∗
Store manager age2 × 100 −0012 −0012∗
Experience with company 0002 0002
Store manager is male 0047∗∗ 0043∗∗
Sales focus
“Capable” −0015 −0017 0012
“Strength” 0005 0003 0039
Commercial awareness
“Capable” 0020 0019 0029
“Strength” 0026 0025 0070
Leadership
“Capable” −0008 −0006 −0011
“Strength” 0005 0006 0063
Developing people
“Capable” 0011 0011 0001
“Strength” 0050 0049∗ 0118∗∗
Drive and personal development
“Capable” 0005 0004 0010
“Strength” −0030 −0030 −0021
Planning and organizing
“Capable” −0024 −0023 −0057
“Strength” −0042 −0041 −0041
Competitors in the catchment area Yes Yes No
Adjusted R2 0695 0705 0703
Number of observations 236
aerror 2nd stage is the error term from the second-stage sales equation (2).
b is the error term from the augmented second-stage sales equation (8).
∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ denote estimates significant at 1%, 5%, and 10%,
respectively.
effects on sales lasting longer than a year.6 Once cap-
ital, management, and other fixed inputs have been
set, the only way for a store to adapt to changes
in trading environment is to adjust its annual labor
input. Part of this adjustment happens in response
to changes in the expected value of the unobservable
term, Eerror2nd stagei  = $ · error2nd stagei	−1 (Equation (6)),
implying that labor input in the current year is a
positive function of the last year’s unexpected sales,
error2nd stagei	−1 .
To estimate the annual random shock term , we
take advantage of the fact that, with capital and
management inputs fixed and the trading environ-
ment exogenous, error2nd stagei	−1 is uncorrelated with all
of the observed variables apart from log annual
labor input, lnLi = ln
∑52
k=1 laborik. Therefore, we can
regress annual labor input on the rest of the observed
6 As evidence for the persistence of unexpected sales, recall the
result from §3.4, that in the absence of store fixed effects the esti-
mate for labor input elasticity is biased upward because of labor
input’s correlation with store unobservables containing last year’s
unexpected sales.
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variables that are constant throughout the year (all of
the controls in Equation (2) including the KBIs and
quartile fixed effects, denoted as vector xi),
lnLi = xi&+ 'i	 (7)
and use the estimated residuals from this regression
('ˆi) as a proxy for error
2nd stage
i	−1 in Equation (6). We then
recover  as the residual of the second-stage sales
equation (2), which we rerun with 'ˆi included as a
separate regressor:
̂fixed effecti = 
1 lnspacei +
2KBIi
+
3other controlsi + 'ˆi +i (8)
Note that, because 'ˆi is independent of all of the
observed regression variables in the sales equation by
construction (see Equation (7)), all of the estimates in
Table 4 remain the same.
5.3. Manager Pay Regression Results
Table 6 reports the regression results for log store
manager total annual pay in 2006. As can be seen
from column (1), the annual random shock term mea-
sured simply as the second-stage error (error2nd stage)
from the sales regression is unimportant for store
manager pay. Consequently, our procedure for recov-
ering  via Equation (8) is indeed necessary to
reveal the incentives available to store managers.
Columns (2) and (3) then demonstrate that, once we
correct error2nd stage for persistent unobservables that
both managers and HQ can predict, it becomes a sig-
nificant determinant of pay. This result supports our
incentive pay model (Equation (5)).
The incentives to perform come from the possibil-
ity of failing to meet sales expectations, which then
means a cut in the next year’s pay. The 0.233 elastic-
ity result shows the proportion in which unexpected
sales gains and losses are shared between the man-
agers and the company. It is the manager’s aversion
to risk (> 0, see Equation (4)) that limits full sharing.
Thus, a 10% change in  (not unusual and close to ’s
standard deviation of 0.11) results in a 2.3% change in
a store manager’s pay.
As can be seen from Table 6, there is no signif-
icant link between pay and commercial awareness.
This finding parallels that of Bloom and Van Reenen’s
(2007, p. 1386), who also find no link between the
management score in a firm and its CEO’s pay. Com-
parison of columns (2) and (3) shows that there is
no link whether or not we control for other potential
correlates of manager skill grade, such as manager
age and experience, or pay for a similar job and local
competition, which proxy the outside opportunities
available to managers. The implication is that the KBI
commercial awareness measures a type of company-
specific manager skill that raises sales in company
stores as we have seen but that is not easily tradable
on the outside labor market.
Turning to the other determinants of manager
pay, we see that pay is 4.3% higher for male store
managers and for those living in areas with higher
managerial pay (an elasticity of 0.354)—presumably
reflecting the more generous outside options available
to them. Managing more workers attracts a significant
premium as well (0.284), which is consistent with the
greater responsibilities of running a larger store and
has nothing to do with rewarding skill.
6. Discussion
6.1. Management and Economic Performance:
Some Illustrations
We find that the most important management skill is
commercial awareness, which rewards efficient use of
store space and workforce, sticking to the wage bud-
get, and watching competitors. Variation in commer-
cial awareness is responsible for a sizable portion of
variation in labor productivity. Using the results from
our preferred specification (column (6) in Table 4) we
find that moving from the bottom quartile of the dis-
tribution of commercial awareness (i.e., development
need, 18% of the sample) to the top quartile (strength,
26%) is associated with a 13.9% improvement in sales,
which, holding all factor inputs constant, results in
the same improvement in labor productivity. With the
interquartile range in store labor productivity at 40%,
commercial awareness accounts for approximately
35% (=13.9/40) of it. Continuing to assume the cost of
sales to be a constant fraction of sales, we calculate the
interquartile range of store total factor productivity
(TFP) at 52%;7 hence, commercial awareness accounts
for approximately 27% of the interquartile range
in TFP.
Based on our regression results in Table 4, let us
now calculate the contribution to sales, (, of man-
ager skills higher than grade development need. We
compare actual sales with some plausible counterfac-
tuals as follows:
(=
2∑
k=0
SakG
a
k − SckGck	 (9)
where k= 0	1	2 is an indicator for commercial aware-
ness grade (0= development need, 2= strength), Sa	ck
are the actual (a) and counterfactual (c) shares of
7 We calculate TFP as the term A from the Cobb-Douglas sales func-
tion, giving TFP= log sales−0516× log number of hours worked−
0116× log store space. This measure includes the contribution of
the cost of sales, which, given that it is proportional to sales, does
not affect TFP’s interquartile range.
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worker-hours controlled by managers of grade k in
total, and Ga	ck are sales gains from higher manage-
ment grades as compared with development need.
We calculate the shares in total labor controlled by
managers of different grades taking into account the
differences in the size of the stores run by them, giving
Sa0 = 0134, Sa1 = 0509, and Sa2 = 0357. From Table 4,
Ga0 = Gc0 = 0, Ga1 = 0092, and Ga2 = 0139. Suppose
in the counterfactual that all managers are develop-
ment need and are allocated to stores of the same size
(that is, the share in total workforce controlled by each
grade is equal to its share in the store manager skill
grades distribution), so that Gc0 = Gc1 = Gc2 = 0, and
Sc0 = 0176, Sc1 = 0563, Sc2 = 0261 (see Table 3). Sub-
stituting these parameter values into Equation (9), we
calculate the contribution at 9.6% of the actual sales,
or £23 million for our sample.
Rewriting Equation (9), we can break down the
total 9.6% contribution into two components: (i) that
due to allocation of abler managers to bigger stores,
holding gains from manager skills fixed, and (ii) that
due to manager skills alone, holding store size equal
for all managers, as follows:
(=
2∑
k=0
GakS
a
k − Sck︸ ︷︷ ︸
manager allocation
+
2∑
k=0
SckG
a
k −Gck︸ ︷︷ ︸
manager skills

Given our chosen counterfactual, the first compo-
nent (manager allocation) contributes only 0.9% of the
total 9.6%, and the second component makes up the
remaining 8.7%. The small contribution of manager
allocation is consistent with the weak link between
store size and commercial awareness score reported in
Table 5. Moreover, the gains from manager allocation
would remain limited even if abler managers always
ran larger stores. For instance, even under a per-
fect correspondence of manager skill grade and store
size rank, the total contribution of management skills
to sales would be 10.8%, a mere 1.2-point increase.
Hence most of the sales gains from manager skills are
independent of manager allocation by store size.
6.2. Our Results and Other Studies
Because store manager skills are highly specific and
difficult to allocate among stores in the short run, our
results help explain part of persistent interworkplace
differences in productivity documented in the litera-
ture (Bartelsman and Doms 2000, Griffiths et al. 2006).
It is instructive to compare our quantitative find-
ings for management with those in the studies closest
to ours. Our estimate of the share of the interquar-
tile range of store TFP explained by store manage-
ment, 27%, is higher than Bloom and Van Reenen’s’s
(2007) 10%–23%. A possible explanation for this dif-
ference is that in a cross-company study such as theirs
it is harder to control for company-specific factors
affecting the relationship between management and
productivity. As a result, this relationship may be
blurred by “contingent management” (pp. 1371–1374),
whereby practices are employed in different combi-
nations as befits the company in question. The blur-
ring occurs through combining many management
practices, some of which are irrelevant to productiv-
ity, into one z-score, which effectively increases the
measurement error component in the management
regressor, therefore resulting in an attenuated esti-
mate. Thus, when we put grades from all of the KBIs
into a management z-score, its interquartile variation
explains only a 6% movement in store productiv-
ity, thereby accounting for only 6/52 = 12% of the
interquartile store TFP range, on a par with Bloom
and Van Reenen’s (2007) 10%–23%.
On the other hand, if aggregating individual com-
petencies into a z-score attenuates the estimate for
management because of measurement error, the ques-
tion arises as to why our estimate of the share of
the interquartile store productivity range explained
by management (35%) is close to the 40% found
by Griffiths et al. (2006), which they derive from
the management score aggregating over 11 measures.
The reason seems to be fewer controls used in their
study, a possibility that they do anticipate (p. 523).
Thus, when we control only for labor input (as
they do), the interquartile range in our management
z-score explains nearly 70% of the interquartile store
productivity range. Hence, the degree of detail in
management data and statistical controls are equally
important for the quantitative results of a manage-
ment study.
Although most of our findings so far are consistent
with the existing literature, our finding that compe-
tence in developing people is insignificant for sales
seems to contradict the many studies showing the
importance of high-performance HRM practices for
firm performance (e.g., Ichniowski et al. 1997). There
will be no contradiction, however, if one acknowl-
edges the context of this company’s business and the
coexistence of different work systems within it. Such
high-performance HRM practices as selection, train-
ing, and pay for performance are clearly important
for core employees such as store managers. On the
other hand, the sales assistants, who are predomi-
nantly part-time and inexpensive to replace, receive
a much lighter HRM package from the company,
and store managers can contribute only marginally.
The coexistence of different work systems within one
company—in our case, one for managers, another for
sales assistants—is not unusual and has been found
before (Leepak et al. 2007).
Turning to the manager pay results, our 0.23 esti-
mate of the elasticity of pay with respect to the annual
random shock term  is slightly to the right of the
range of estimates reported in the literature for the
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elasticity of CEO compensation to share returns, for
example, Murphy’s (1986) 0.14, Barro and Barro’s
(1990) 0.17, and Conyon and Murphy’s (2000) 0.12 for
the United Kingdom and 0.27 for the United States.
Admittedly, we should not push comparisons from
such different regression specifications too far. But,
noting that our measure of  may be regarded as
similar to unexpected share returns, it is interesting
that our estimate of the key incentive pay parame-
ter appears to be broadly consistent with those previ-
ously reported.
Our results fit with the literature even more closely
when it comes to the elasticity of manager pay with
respect to firm (store) size. Our 0.284 estimate (Table 7)
is well within the range of estimates reported: 0.22 for
UK and 0.41 for U.S. firms (Conyon and Murphy’s
2000); 0.37 for the top 1,000 U.S. corporations (Gabaix
and Landier 2008); 0.32 for U.S. banks (Barro and
Barro’s 1990); 0.25 for Canadian publicly traded firms
(Zhou 2000); and 0.25 for small U.S. firms (total assets
up to 150 million 1993 U.S. dollars) in Cyert et al.
(2002). This range is fairly narrow, considering differ-
ences in samples with respect to time, country, and
industry, but our result fits neatly within it. The simi-
larities between our pay results for middle managers
and those from studies of CEOs are noteworthy and
suggest that similar incentive mechanisms are at work
at the middle as well as the top of the management
hierarchy.
Finally, the manager pay results indicate that store
manager skills in our company, particularly commer-
cial awareness skills, are highly specific. They are
important for sales and yet are not rewarded. This
finding might seem surprising, but it accords exactly
with the result in Bloom and Van Reenen’s (2007), that
CEO pay is not correlated with the management score
(p. 1386). The implication is that the market for man-
ager skills is more limited than might be expected.8
Admittedly, the description of commercial awareness
(Table 2) appears to reveal a mixture of general skills
(e.g., manpower planning) and specific skills (e.g.,
making the best use of a store’s space), as envisaged
in the human capital literature starting from Becker
(1964). Yet, in our case of store managers, even though
we seem to have the usual mixture of general and
specific skills, these skills are more specific than might
be thought.
8 Hence we have Peter Drucker’s (1974) classic statement that “It
is an admission of bankruptcy for a big business to have to go on
the outside to recruit into top management. It is also a desperate
gamble” (p. 662). Thus, although much is made of the fluid market
for managers, it seems in fact that most managers, from top man-
agers (Bailey and Helfat 2003) down to our small store managers,
are groomed within their firms.
7. Conclusions
In this paper we have looked into the black box
of the middle management input in the production
function of a firm and how this input is shaped by
firmwide corporate governance practices. To do so,
we have used data from a single firm. Our study thus
shares the “insider econometrics” paradigm (Bartel
et al. 2004) with other studies of the management—
performance link, such as Ichniowski et al. (1997) and
Griffiths et al. (2006). To Crossland and Hambrick’s
(2007) consideration of “macro environment” con-
straints on management, our study can be seen as
analyzing the micro environment. Let us summarize
our findings and their implications.
We find a strong link between the company’s mea-
sure of manager skill grade—the KBIs—and store
sales performance, and we believe that this link
is causal. The company’s procedures are objective.
Moreover, our allowing for store size effects provides
a powerful control that reduces simultaneity between
manager quality and store performance. The core of
our study, the management measure and its effect on
performance, is therefore meaningful.
The middle manager skills that we find most
important are described by the KBI for commercial
awareness. It encapsulates entrepreneurial skills, such
as monitoring local competition and making efficient
use of available resources. Differences in commer-
cial awareness skills between store managers explain
a considerable part of inter-store productivity differ-
ences: 27%–35%, depending on the measure. The esti-
mated total contribution to sales of manager skills
above grade “development need” is 9.6% of the total
actually observed. Thus, we find a significant con-
tribution of middle (store) management to produc-
tivity. This result shows that “management matters”
(Hambrick and Mason 1984) and specifically supports
Kanter’s (2004) research on the importance of the
middle management tier.
At the same time, we find a long tail of poor
managers, comparable with that found between firms
(Bloom and Van Reenen’s 2007), and this motivates
our inquiry into the firmwide practices of manag-
ing the managers. Of these we have considered in
detail allocating managers to stores of different size
and incentivizing them through pay-for-performance
contracts. We have found that abler managers tend
to be assigned to larger stores, but their allocation is
rather imprecise. However, our results also suggest
that, even if allocation of managers to stores is perfect,
securing the gains from manager skills still requires
overcoming agency issues, especially when company
operations are so dispersed geographically.
We show with an adaptation of Holmström’s (1979)
incentive pay model that the corporate governance
practice of annual manager salary review helps
accomplish this task. In support of our incentive pay
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model, we find that the process of salary review works
to give an expected annual sales value for the manager
in her store (which we assume is determined by the
sales function that we estimate). Our findings show
that positive/negative deviations are indeed propor-
tionately rewarded/punished.
At the same time, we find that, while controlling
manager effort, the company does not seem to reward
middle manager skills, because higher-graded store
managers do not receive higher pay all else equal.
The implication here is that not only are top man-
ager skills specific (Bailey and Helfat 2003) and gen-
erally difficult to trade or imitate, but so are middle
manager skills. This finding therefore suggests that it
makes sense for organizations to develop their man-
agement resources in-house—as a source of competi-
tive advantage that cannot be easily bid away.
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